How to Win Friends and Influence Bloggers

I just finished up The Making of a Philosopher: My Journey Through Twentieth-Century Philosophy (HarperCollins, 2002), by Colin McGinn, an English philosopher now at Rutgers. It is sort of a pain-free introduction to analytic philosophy, packaged as a readable memoir. I found his short discussion of propositions versus "propositional attitudes" such as belief, hope, or doubt, rather helpful (p. 127-42). Seeing the difference and distinguishing between the two when writing (especially online) helps avoid a lot of misunderstanding and conflict, I think.

Much of our thinking passes before us as attitudes: we react to what we hear or read in terms of belief and desire or doubt and disgust. Faith is a propositional attitude, which in the Mormon context means accepting or believing some propositions about the Church. Yet when we speak we often suppress our attitudes and express beliefs as facts. The following tend to pass as synonymous on Sunday: The Church is true, I know the Church is true, I believe the Church is true. I think it's worth noting the differences and using them to communicate better, especially online.

Propositions. Churches aren't true, only propositions about churches (or anything else) can be true. When someone says "the Church is true," what exactly is it they are asserting as true or as a fact? Thinking in terms of propositions helps us clarify what we are really saying or asserting. Given there are differences in belief (liberal Mormons appear to accept a different set of beliefs than mainstream Mormons, for instance) it is worth exercising some care in stating carefully exactly what one is trying to say.

The recurring question "Are Mormons Christian?" is another example. An endless stream of Christian commentators asserts "Mormons are not Christians" without first spelling out clearly what exactly a Christian is: "A Christian must believe X, Y, and Z, and reject S and T." Of course, different commentators and denominations will fill in those elements differently. The resulting diversity of definitions and beliefs will lead to a conclusion something like "Not all Christians are Christian," which kind of takes the sting out of the charge that Mormons aren't Christian. If done pleasantly, however, the exercise of delineating denominational differences (the X, Y, and Zs above) can lead to a sense of fellowship rather than finger-pointing and name-calling. How Wide the Divide should not be such a novelty.

Facts. Another benefit to clarifying propositions is that it points to facts that speak to the question. "A Christian believes that Paul wrote Romans" leads to a different conversation than "A Christian believes Christ was physically resurrected." Some propositions point to a variety of facts that make the proposition, at least in theory, provable or refutable. There are facts one can bring to bear on the question of authorship of Romans or other texts, which go some way toward "proving" or at least giving strong support one way or the other to the authorship question.

Other propositions are simply not subject to proof, either because of an absence of facts or because they are too general to be evaluated. "Mormons are not Christians" is too general until one defines what a Christian is or does or believes. "Christ was physically resurrected" suffers from an absence of facts--one can cite Bible verses recording other people's convictions and have energetic discussions, but facts are in short supply. In theory, there could be evidence which would speak directly to the question, say if there had been a security camera in the tomb. [There are accounts by Biblical writers of post-resurrection appearances, of course, which are sufficient for some but not others.]

How To Say Things. Here's the payoff: You want to be able to state your beliefs and views without needlessly antagonizing those who disagree with you. That sounds easy, doesn't it? IMHO, we all too often fall short, and sometimes people even intentionally antagonize those who disagree with them! Can't help those folks, but negligence is curable: Reserve bold statements for provable propositions supported by sufficient facts: "Paul wrote Romans." Even then, adding "propositional attitude" language can soften the statement while still making it perfectly clear what you accept as fact and why: "I am persuaded that Paul wrote Romans" leads to a much friendlier exchange with someone who disagrees with you than the bold statement. Bold statements are invitations to bold rejections, the beginning of an argument. Attitude statements are invitations to questions or comments, the beginning of a discussion. Personally, I prefer discussions.

These are simply my own sketchy reflections (starting from McGinn's short discussion) on how to talk about controversial questions such as religion in a friendly and productive manner. There are two or three very bright Bloggernackers who have mastered these or similar techniques, based on my reading of their posts and comments--how refreshing! Hopefully these thoughts will help those interested (and certainly myself) to acquire that commendable style of discussion.

Comments

[Clark Goble]

Now we need to get you reading some continental philosophy so you can understand how the Church can be true and how truth can't be considered a set of propositions... (grin)

BTW - the bigger confusion, I've noticed, is less between propositions and propositional attitudes than it is between statements and propositions. This is especially true regarding indexicals. (i.e. statements of the sort, "I am inside" and whether that is a true statement or proposition) My favorite analytic philosopher is Donald Davidson and he usually is careful to deal with statement rather than propositions (except in certain qualified ways) presumably because of this issue.

The problem is though that the move from statements to propositions is anything but uncontroversial. Why? Because it entails an act of interpretations which gets us into hermeneutics and once again various Continental issues.

[Dave]

Clark, my prior impressions of analytic philosophy were that it was dry and rather narrow. Either that has changed or I have become more interested in topics like language and philosophy of mind. I've got books by Davidson and Putnam lying around--that should do for a couple of months.

[Ann]

Most excellent post; I've referenced it on one of my favorite discussion boards where we've been talking about black and white thinking.

[Dave]

Thanks for the link, Ann. I'll expect a few visitors tomorrow.

[Clark Goble]

What's interesting is that the distinction between analytic and continental philosophy is fairly arbitrary and somewhat misleading. Lots of similar elements pop up in both.

Propositions are interesting to me, precisely because they are ubiquitous and yet strangely mysterious. They are what is asserted, believed, assented to, and so forth. They aren't all sentences, yet in other ways they appear to be sentences. They can, if one isn't careful, lead into all sorts of errors. Yet they are taken for granted in most analytic studies. Normally it isn't a big deal since most analytic philosophy considers the simple cases to understand them. But where those break down are very interesting...

Personally I find analytic philosophy terribly fascinating. But I've not delved into it much due to focusing in on Heidegger and related issues. But I've been rereading Davidson of late and forgot how much I enjoy him.

[Nate Oman]

Dave: Now you need to start reading the analytic philosophy of law -- You thought Russell and Davidson was fun, wait until you hang out with H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz!

[Dave]

Nate, you would be pleased to know I picked up a copy of Hart's "The Concept of Law" last month, so I'll just add it to the hopper. I think I was motivated by all the titles you were throwing around T&S at the time.

[Nate Oman]

Dave: Read Hart! You have to realize, however, that Hart is for current analytic jurisprudence what Wiggtenstein is for current analytic philosophy. He kicks it off, and everyone is arguing with or about him since then. I am also a big fan of Jules Coleman, but this is largely because I am interested in law & economics and Coleman is one of the few guys in analytic jurisprudence who treats L&E knowledgeably and responsibly. I have been looking for Mormons interested in contemporary philosophy of law who are willing to talk to me, and I can't find anyone. Mike Durham just finished up his Ph.D. at Yale under Jules Coleman. (I am supressing my envy and educational regret.) Mike, however, is too busy to muck around with me much.