Theological Foundations Part 2

McMurrin, p. 11-18; see Part 1 (p. 1-11) and Clark's notes on p. 11-18. McMurrin addresses universals and particulars in this section, winding up his treatment of "The Concept of Reality." Wow, reality in 18 pages. Not bad.

McMurrin notes that "from its beginning, Mormonism has laid much stress on the dynamic character of reality" (p. 12). Christianity, following Plato, sees God/ultimate reality as perfect, changeless, and immutable, while Mormonism recognizes eternal progress as a controlling principle, clearly for perfectible humans and somewhat less clearly for a perfect but still increasing God. If God's work is to bring to pass the eternal life of humankind, then He's still working things out, still increasing. McMurrin recognizes the Mormon view of God's will and associated moral values as real and universal, plus he sees some form of reality ascribed in practice to such Mormon ideas as Priesthood (more than just all priesthood holders) and Church (more than just the sum of all members). Yet, in defining the Godhead as Three Persons with no substantial unity, only unity in purpose, Mormonism also has a foot in the nominalist camp.

Clark breaks new ground by using cats as his particular/universal exemplar. I think cats skew the discussion toward nominalism and dynamism--you can never step on the same cat twice. I suspect Idealists tend to be dog people; note the close resemblance between "Fido" and the term "ideos." All dogs go to heaven because Fido, the universal Idea of dogness, is already there in all its perfection and changelessness. Clark also notes that various Mormons differ in their valuation of scientific laws as being universals somewhat independent of God or as being dependent and subject to God's decree.

Personally, I see Mormonism and Mormons as quite content to allow Science to define "reality." Rutherford, Bohr, Einstein, and Hawking helped define physical reality in the 20th century but caused no Galileo-type reaction inside Mormonism. Nor, for that matter, does evolution and biology anymore. Mormonism is quite happy with Science. The only problem comes when some people apply science or scientific reasoning to certain Mormon claims about migration and translation. But the Mormon response is not to reject science, just to argue about how it plays out in our little corner of the cosmos.

Science is materialist; Mormonism accepts spirits and an unseen spirit world. To that extent Mormonism is dualist where science is not. Interestingly, Mormonism sees a strong connection between the two: Joseph recounts how he actually gave the plates and his Nephite interpreters, tangible real-world objects, to Moroni for safekeeping, and received them back later. If this is the case, then the world of spirits is not distinct from our physical world but is overlapping. When Moroni took the plates back for a period of time (or right now), where were these three-dimensional physical objects located? The far side of the Moon? Mars? Inside everlasting burnings (the Sun)? On a planet in the Kolob system? I've never seen this odd question addressed by critics or apologists.

Finally, on Mormon pseudo-universals like Priesthood and Church (noted by McMurrin in what I think is a fairly insightful observation). I have a couple of other candidates: Marriage and Motherhood. Mormons see a marriage as somehow existing in its own right, separate and distinct from the two persons united in holy matrimony. Marriage is eternal--it seems to have a life and existence of its own. And Motherhood, the touchstone of female identity. There's an asymmetry here: men identify with Priesthood, which in terms of eternal increase means collecting lawfully-assigned celestial wives via patriarchal polygamy in the hereafter. Women, on the other hand, identify eternally with Motherhood; they collect children in the present (sealed to them) and the hereafter (eternal increase).

The contrasting interplay of Priesthood (the male pseudo-universal) and Motherhood (the female pseudo-universal) explains why modern Feminism, insisting women be accepted as the social, marital, and sexual equals of men, is so anathema to Mormon leaders. It strikes at the heart of Mormonism's theological assymetry between men (who get plural wives) and women (who don't get plural husbands). I think the leadership is two generations behind the membership on this--most Mormons accept the idea that women are and should be equals, which when followed to its logical conclusion rejects the Mormon pseudo-universals of Priesthood and Motherhood as classically treated in Mormon discussions. It's only the closet polygamists lying low among the population of Mormons in Utah who don't get it, people who just can't get past their own misplaced pride in Grandpa Jedidiah who had six wives. Get over it. Take a leap of faith into the 21st century. Embrace monogamy in principle as well as in fact. With a bit more reserve, the point I'm making is that the Mormon unarticulated pseudo-universals Priesthood and Motherhood explain why the Church can't make a clean break with polygamy. At least that's what I think, reflecting on McMurrin in speculative mode. No doubt some readers view things differently.

Comments

[clark]

Obviously I disagree over your conception of changing concepts. (I think your characterization of the gender roles is incorrect, but so too is the relative stability of the concepts)

One additional fly in your ointment is the problematic nature of "equality." My sense is that by equal you mean symmetrical in relationships. But isn't that itself problematic?

I commented a bit on the problem of universals on my blog today. I think that this is one big problem of McMurrin in that it allows one to conflate relatively stable concepts or structures with universals.

[clark]

Whoops. Hit enter too soon. Put simply, I think McMurrin by not being careful and clear provides a text that can mislead readers into seeing the universal versus nominalist debate as merely a debate about static versus dynamic. I don't think that is correct and can lead to a lot of misunderstandings.

[Dave]

Clark, which changing concepts are you referring to? Do you mean McMurrin's Priesthood and Church, and my Marriage and Motherhood? Or are you referring to changing scientific theories I mentioned earlier in the post?

[Dave]

Clark, okay I went and read your post on universals. Yes, it's clear McMurrin isn't really proposing Priesthood and Church as Platonic universals. Perhaps (from memory here) he was merely trying to make the point that those concepts seem to be given some existent status independent of the nominal units (priests, members) involved. Joseph's Nauvoo-era use of the term "Priesthood" suggests he saw it as a what might best be described as a force. Nowadays, we see "forces" as exchanges of exotic particles. "Church" and "Marriage," on the other hand, might be emergent properties but it seems like McMurrin's point was that these terms are seen as more than just properties.

[clark]

I don't necessarily think universals have to be Platonic universals. (Although that was the most common form) There can be what are called Armstrong Universals as well.

What is most frustrating about McMurrin is he raises these issues in passing and then says nothing about it. Yet they are fairly controversial and (IMO) fairly significant.

I agree that Priesthood is a significant conceptual entity. I have a hard time understanding what it would mean to speak of "Priesthood" as an universial except as a strong neoPlatonic universal ala some of the Resaissance speculations. Which, given the Book of Abraham, Masonry and so forth, can't be neglected as an influence on Joseph Smith. But McMurrin doesn't really get into these issues.

BTW - seeing forces as exchange of exotic particles is seen by many as a "mathematical fiction." Others believe it. It all depends upon how one interprets what are called Feynman Diagrams. The problem with interpreting them realistically is that commits you to the reality of backwards causality since the particles go backwards in time.